In rural areas of the Ethiopian highlands, tree planting on communal land has been increasing because of active implementation of various sustainable land management projects. Tree planting requires negotiation or coordination among the users of communal land because it may exclude other activities, namely grazing of livestock. This study empirically shows that the transaction costs to reach agreement among land users deter the expansion of tree planting. In other words, tree-planting projects tend to be placed in communities with lower transaction costs. The result implies that tree planting will expand if public policy is directed toward coordinating diversified opinions among community members.
Introduction
In mountainous areas in developing countries, where land is genemlly unfavomble for use in agricultural production, poor people rarely make it out of poverty because an increase in agricultural productivity is difficult to achieve. In steep billside areas, introduction of high-yield crop varieties, machinery, and development of irrigation systems are more costly and technically more difficult to implement than the same innovations are in flat areas. On the other hand, vast communal land, although not suitable for agriculture, is available in these hillside areas. Thus, how to generate income by utilizing the communal resources is an important policy issue.
In the highlands of Ethiopia, la.Ige areas of communal land exist in the mountainous regions. Gebremedhin et al. [4] conducted studies on communal land utilization, showing a wide difference in the efficiency of land management depending on various factors such as the size of the decision-making body responsible for communal resource Illllll8gCD1CDt Hagos and Holden [6] suggest that poor furmers with little resources are not willing to invest in land conservation, making them unable to improve their economic situations. Onild and Gebremichael [9] argue that considerable excess labor exists in the dry season in northern Ethiopia. Although this SUiplus labor is available to support additional economic activities on communal land, However, recently, due to concerns about the depletion of tree resources, the Illliilber of tree-planting projects has been increasing.
Grazing and tree planting can coexist on the same communal land, but the negative externality each activity exerts on the other results in only one being chosen as the exclusive land utilization for a piece of communal land. Our concern is that the land use may not be optimally chosen due to the transaction costs required to reach agreement among people with different interests in how communal resources should be used. In the case of private resources, some researchers argue that high transaction costs in coordination among stakeholders or negotiation for use of related property rights result in underutilization (Michelman [8] , De1bel [3] , Buckley and Kalarickal [2] ).
However, the effects of transaction costs on utilization of communal resources have been rarely investigated.
Considering that tree planting is a new activity on communal land where grazing used to be prevalent, the conversion of land use from grazing to tree planting should require a lot of negotiation and, hence, be difficult Thus, we posit a hypothesis that transaction costs for negotiation or coordination hinder the utilization of communal land for tree-planting projects in rural areas of the Ethiopian highlands. The objective of this paper is to empirically test this hypothesis in order to identify policy implications for more efficient utilization of communal land in the highland area of Ethiopia.
Communal land management in Ethiopia
Ethiopia transformed from a socialist economy to a market-oriented economy in the early 1990s. While the country maintained state ownership of land, it dislnbuted farmland to each farm household Local communities (small, natuial villages called gots in the local Tigrinya language) or village (also known as a Peasant Association (PA)i> offices managed most communal resources in rural areas. Later, responsibility for the management of many communal lands was transferred from village offices to local communities. Villages are frequently too large for a cen1ral office to manage all the details of communal land; therefore, smaller administrative units can often manage connmmalland mare sust:amably (Gebremedhin et al. [5] ).
After the devolution of administtative powers to local communities was complete, most comnn.mities made their own rules and regulations for communal land utilization. It is interesting to DOte that although local comnn.mities manage communal land, district government offices also play an important role in communal land management. In this respect, communal land is DOt regarded as purely common property of the local commuoity. Jagger et al. [7] argue that local administtation (i.e., village (PA)) has excessive power over forest management in Ethiopia. Northern Ethiopia's Tigray Region experienced both civil war and international conflict until the early 1990s. Continuous civil wars during the communist regime, as well as high demand for firewood, con1nbuted to deforestation in the region.
Since the economic and political reform of the early 1990s, the government bas emphasized rehabilitation of communal land through various measun:s such as reforestation, protection of the land from animal grazing, and soil and water conservation. Cutting 1rees in communal land is strictly prolnbited.
Despite remarkable improvement of vegetation on communal land after the reform, it is not fully known how the land con1nbutes to improved livelihood for its inhabitants. Wood [11] argues that OVeiplOtection of forestry in developing countries undermines local people's livelihoods. However, there exists insufficient evidence to determine the effectiveness of current communal land management practices in increasing the economic wellbeing IJ Peasant Association (PA) in a village is called kebele in Amharic, the Ethiopian common language, and tabia in Tigrinya. of commuoity members.
3.Data
In order to investigate local management of communal land, we conducted surveys of commuoities in the Emba Alaje woreda (district) in the Tigray Region of northern Ethiopia. Five villages (PAs) with similar geographic conditions were selected (Figure l ) . Intensive surveys were conducted in the village of Keyih Tek:li All communities (gots) in each village (PA), except in the case of Simret, are included in the sample. The number of comnn.mities in the village of Simret is much larger than in other villages, so those communities were selected for the survey by a random sampling method. The total sample size was 113. 1\vo or more executives from each community, including a community leader, participated in an interview and answered questions.
Communal land in Emba Alaje may be classified as ''forest," "pasture," or ''bare land." Pasture includes close
grazing land and open pasture. This study employs the classifications used by the local inhabitants, as it is based on their perceptions and closely reflects actual land utilization. 'JYpically, the entire community meets (known as a community meeting) to determine the local rules for communal land use. Some communal land is utilized by more than one community, such as the case of a forest located around the border of two communities and used by both. Accordingly, a committee that includes both communities is formed and that committee makes decisions on forest usage. In such a joint IlllllUigelllent case, coordination of different interests among members is more difficult than with a single community. If a communal land is located within a domain area CJf one community, only that community uses it On the other hand, if communal land is located around the border between two COJ]]J]]Jmities so that both communities use it, the land is jointly managed. Thus, joint management of communal land is determined by geographical factors.
Results of the survey
The survey results show that various types of comnnmal land utilization rules exist in the area. Table 1 illustrates the proportion of communities that have rules regarding economic activities in communal forests. More communities tend to allow oxen to graze more than cows and calves. Farmers in the Ethiopian highlands consider oxen the most important animals for farm production because they use oxen as draft animals for cultivation (Aune et al. [1 ] ). As a whole, most activities except firewood collection are related to animal husbandry, and no free tree planting by individuals is permitted in these areas. Tree planting by individuals is allowed only under a regional government program called the hillside distribution program (''Hillside and Gully Dis1ribution and Utiliza1ion'1, which started in 2011 and allocates communal land plots to landless youths (youths defined as people 18---35 years old).
In addition, 31% of communities participated in domestic or international !roo-planting projects in the last ten years (individual fimners do not have a choice on participation).
With the exception of collecting grass (so-called cut-and- The productivity and intensity of crop production in individual farms varies across communities: People who earn higher incomes in agriculture may conserve more communal land for future generations, while poor people may pursue income through animal grazing in the forests (Pender and Gebremedhin [10] ). Although planting eucalyptus trees on private land is common practice in this area as eucalyptus is bought and sold at local markets, not all the communities in Emba Alaje have adopted tree-planting projects on communal lands.
Labor shortages and low profitability would seem to be the most plausible reasons that commercial trees are rarely planted on communal land. However, our previous study (i.e., Oniki and Gebremichael [9] ) rejected these hypotheses.
One would also think that if comnmnal land were fur from residential areas or water sources, people would be reluctant to plant trees there. However, even with some communal land being located near villages and water sources, it is still not used for forestry.
Thus, it is justifiable to posit that the non-adoption of tree-planting projects is caused by the existence of transaction costs for coordination of resource use for tree-planting when people try to exclude others. Transaction costs for negotiation among community members with diverse concerns may hinder the ability to achieve consensus.
Exclusivity of use differentiates forestry from animal husbandry. Once trees are planted on communal land, the area is enclosed so that no animals can enter until the trees grow to a certain stage. In some cases, new forests are enclosed forever. Even if a forest is communal, it excludes those who are grazing animals in the communal areas. This exclusive nature creates transaction costs for coordinating communal land use, resulting in communal land not being fully utilized for forestry production.
Exclusion also requires costs for monitoring or enclosure. In Emba Alaje. most communities hire guards or people in the community take shifts worlring as guards.
According to our survey, the average wage for hiring a guard to protect a community forest is 9.9 birr per day, while the average annual fee collected from community members for communal land protection is 19.9 birr per 2) Fmmland was allocated to those above 18 years old in the 1990s. Those who were under 18 years old were considered "landless."
household Compared to the average value of Eucalyptus timber ( 41 birr per cord) and the average wage for a farm worker (32.6 birr per day), the cost for a guard is not high. program, as well as other governmental and intcmati.onal projects, has carried out tree planting. Unlike previous projects, which were intended for rehabilitation of natural resources rather 1han commercial utilization, the hillside dislribution program was the fust to allow people to cut trees as part of a 1ree-planting project The proportion of tree planting is lower in the case of joint management The Chi-squared tests also find statistical significance at the 1 00/o level, suggesting that tree planting is less active where negotiation among usem is more dffiicult We also confirmed that tree planting and ox grazing have a negative correlation (Table 4) , showing their mutually exclusive characteristics. The bivariate probit model, though seemingly unrelated, is used to estimate tree planting and animal grazing factors since the error terms are possibly correlated The dependent variables are the probability of tree planting and that of grazing in community i. The variable for tree planting equals 1 if the community planted in the last 10 years and 0 otherwise. That of grazing equals 1 if it permits grazing and 0 otherwise. The sample size is now decreased to 94 since some communities lack comnmnalland.
Distnbution of communal land to landless fanners is an
The definitions of dependent variables are listed in Table  5 . The variable of joint management equals 1 if a community jointly manages a communal forest with another community. As discussed above, it represents the difficulty of making rules for communal land. It should be noted that this variable is exogenous, since it is determined by geographical factors. If communal land is locatOO on the border between two communities, the land must be managed jointly, because both communities have rights to use the land. If a communal land is located inside of a territory of one community, joint management never occurs.
Thus, it is not determined by people's decision but by the location. Therefore, we regard joint management as an exogenous variable. 4 l Controlling for all the household-level and community-level variables that may affect demand for a particular land use, the variable of joint management will capture only the difficulty of negotiation. While the governance capability of the community may have influences, it is dffiicult to obSCJVe it This study assumes the governance capability is neutral to tree planting and animal grazing activities. IBnd is not fully used for forestry productinn. A possible reason for it is 1he transaction costs for coordination. Since tree planting excludes using 1he IBnd for animal grazing, negotiatioo 1o get new approvals for planting is not easy.
Even if tree planting is more profitable than animal hnsbaodry, such difficulty in coordinatioo makes fuller nse of local oomnnmal resources impossible.
Our fiodings have several policy implicatioos. Most sigoificantly, since 1he underutilizatioo of oomnnmal IBnd for tree-planting (particnlarly IBnd jointly maoaged by different communities) is driven by the existence of transactioo costs, allocation of jointly used oomnnmaiiBnd to ao individcal coomrunity may increase 1ree planting. In cases where geographic or social reasoos would make dividing oomnnmal IBnd difficult, 1he government should help coordinate 1he dilfurent interests of coomrunity members to facilitate a resohrtion.
